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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This appeal is properly within the jurisdiction of the
Utah State Supreme Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(j) U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41(b) OF THE URCP.
A.

INTRODUCTION

B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
AT-WILL AND OTHERWISE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
DEFENDANT'S 1973 "GENERAL CODE OF CONDUCT",
CONSTITUTE AN IMPLIED TERM AND CONDITION OF
REBUTTED THE PRESUMPTION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS

IN FINDING THAT
FAILED TO
EMPLOYMENT AND
HIRED AT WILL.

2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S ORAL REPRESENTATIONS AND HISTORICAL CONDUCT OF
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE TO PLAINTIFF
AND OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL WAS MERELY "GOOD MANAGEMENT"
RATHER THAN AN IMPLIED TERM AND CONDITION OF PLAINTIFF'S
EMPLOYMENT.
3. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
PROPERLY CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS, JERRY HANSEN.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The trial court's findings supporting an order of dismissal
under Rule 41(b) URCP shall not be disturbed unless "clearly
erroneous".

Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987).

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is appropriately applied
when the trial judge finds that the claimant has either failed
to make out a prima facie case or when the trial judge is not
-1-

persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant.

Id.

Rule 41(b) permits a court trying a case without a jury to
grant a motion to dismiss when it concludes "that upon the
facts and the law the Plaintiff has shown no right to relief".
The trial court is not precluded from granting such a motion
merely because plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, as it
is when ruling on a Rule 50(a) motion for a directed verdict in
a case tried to a jury.

Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping

Company, 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985).

The purpose of the

rule is to permit the judge, as the fact finder, "to weigh the
evidence, draw inferences therefrom and, if it finds the
evidence insufficient to make out a case for the plaintiff, to
render a decision for the defendant on the merits".

Id.

In reviewing involuntary dismissals, appellate courts give
great weight to the findings made and the inferences drawn by
the trial judge, but must reject his findings found to be
clearly erroneous.

Findings are clearly erroneous if they are

against the clear weight of the evidence or if the reviewing
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.

On the other hand, a reviewing court

will not defer to conclusions of law but will review them for
correctness.

Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d

951, 954 (Utah App. 1988).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This wrongful termination action for lost income and
fringe benefits was brought following the discharge of
Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter, Plaintiff) from his
employment with Defendant/Appellee (hereinafter, Defendant) on
January 31, 1989. On that date, Plaintiff was summarily and
without warning terminated from his $50,000 per year, mid-level
management position for alleged inadeguate

performance.

Plaintiff's termination occurred without any advance notice of
Defendant's dissatisfaction with Plaintiff's performance, and
despite fifteen years of satisfactory performance evaluations,
the last given just three months prior to Plaintiff's
discharge.
Plaintiff alleges that throughout his fifteen year
employment, an implied-in-fact agreement existed which entitled
him to a procedure of progressive discipline, including notice,
hearing and just cause, before being terminated by the
Defendant for inadeguate performance.

Defendant's termination

of Plaintiff's employment was contrary to the agreement of the
parties and has caused Plaintiff to be damaged thereby.
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff's Complaint in this matter was filed in the
-3-

Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, on September 18,
1989•

Defendant answered timely and the parties commenced

discovery by way of paper requests and depositions.
In August 1990, Defendant brought its Motion for Summary
Judgment alleging, in part, that no implied contract of
employment existed between the parties requiring, (1) cause for
termination; (2) advance notice of unsatisfactory job
performance; and, (3) the application of progressive discipline
prior to Plaintiff's termination from employment.

(Def. Memo,

in Support of Mot. for Sum. Jud. p. 3, attached hereto as
Exhibit 5)
Plaintiff filed its response and moved to amend its
Complaint.

After oral argument, the Court granted Plaintiff

leave to amend its Complaint and denied Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The trial Court's denial was based on the

finding that genuine issues of material fact existed with
respect to the formation of an implied contract of employment.
(Order, para. 2, attached hereto as Exhibit 6).

Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed its Amended Complaint, an Amended Answer was
filed by Defendant, additional deposition discovery was taken
by Defendant and the case was ultimately set for trial.

Prior

to trial, the Court bifurcated proceedings on the issues of
liability and damages.
On the issue of Defendant's liability, Plaintiff's case in
chief, was tried before the Bench on January 27-30, 1992. The
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trial Court and the parties toured the Defendant's Bonneville
concentrator the morning of January 27th, after which Plaintiff
commenced presentation of its case. At trial, Plaintiff
introduced the testimony of the following witnesses:
1.

Kelly Sorenson (Plaintiff)

2.

Gerald Hansen (Plaintiff's former supervisor)

3.

Tracy Johnson (Former Magna smelter general foreman)

4. Stewart Smith (Smelter manager. Testimony by
videotape due to witness's unavailability)
At the close of Plaintiff's evidence and, because
additional time was unavailable, the Court scheduled further
proceedings and set Defendant's case in defense for May 26-29,
1992.
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, Defendant moved for
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Said Motion was not heard until March 12, 1992, at

which time the parties appeared and presented oral argument.
Defendant's Motion was granted and the Court's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered on April 2,
1992.
On or about May 1, 1992, the trial Court judge, Honorable
Scott Daniels, left the bench due to his candidacy for the
position of Utah State Attorney General.

-5-

c.
RELEVANT FACTS
At trial, Plaintiff identified five factors relevant to
the creation of an implied-in-fact contract of employment.
Those factors are as follows:

(1) Defendant's 1973 General

Rules of Conduct, signed by the parties; (2) Defendant's
management training regarding progressive discipline given
Plaintiff during his employment; (3) Defendant's oral
instruction that Plaintiff and other supervisory personnel were
entitled to progressive discipline prior to discipline or
discharge; (4) Defendant's historical application of
progressive discipline to Plaintiff and other supervisory
personnel; and, (5) Defendant's use of regular performance
evaluations.
The following evidence was introduced in support of each
element.
1,

1973 General Rules of Conduct
Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant on March 31, 1974.

(Trans, p. 50)

Contemporaneous with his hiring, Plaintiff was

interviewed by Defendant's Director of Human Resources, Charles
Bird.

(Trans, p. 51)

During the interview, Bird asked

Plaintiff to read and sign a company policy statement entitled
General Rules of Conduct.

(1973 General Rules of Conduct

attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Trans, p. 53) The
General Rules of Conduct, dated July 1, 1973, was admitted at
-6-

trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

(Trans, p. 55) Relevant

language in the document states that the enumerated rules,
although "not all-inclusive", are "the general rules of conduct
that apply to all Kennecott personnel while on company
operating property".

(Emphasis added).

The document also

states that, "Violation of these rules is cause for either, (1)
written warning; or, (2) suspension subject to hearing for
discipline purposes.

Such a hearing can result in penalty,

layoff or discharge, depending upon the seriousness of the
offense."

(Exhibit 1)

During the interview, Plaintiff discussed Defendant's
policy statement with Mr. Bird.

Mr. Bird told Plaintiff that

the Rules of Conduct set forth the means by which violations of
company rules would be addressed.

(Trans, p. 54)

Plaintiff

signed the document to evidence that he had read and understood
its contents.

(Trans, p. 53) The Rules of Conduct was

additionally signed by Defendant's smelter manager, D.A.
Kinneberg.

(Exhibit 1, Trans, p. 53)

During the interview, Plaintiff signed other company
documents such as forms for initiating coverage in Defendant's
group insurance plan and Defendant's Confidentiality Agreement.
(Trans, p. 54-55)
Following the Bird interview, Plaintiff was interviewed in
Defendant's Magna smelter by employee relations representative,
Gene Bryant.

(Trans, p. 57-58)
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Bryant told Plaintiff that he

was expected to follow the provisions of the General Rules of
Conduct and that breaches of the policy could lead to
discipline or discharge.

(Trans, p. 57-58)

At the time of his hiring, Plaintiff recalled no specific
discussion describing his status in the work place or the use
of the words, "at-will".
2.

(Trans, p. 56, 58)

Defendant's Management Training
While employed with Defendant, Plaintiff held the

following positions:
a.

1974 metallurgical engineer.

(Magna smelter)

(Trans,

p. 59)
b.

Mid-1974 until early 1976 filled in for frontline

foremen and general foremen.
c.

(Magna smelter)

(Trans, p. 60)

1976 to early 1977 material handling general foreman.

(Magna smelter) (Trans, p. 61)
d.
foreman.
e.
smelter)
f.

1977 to 1979-80 reverberator and converter general
(Mange smelter)

(Trans, p. 61)

1979-80 material handling general foreman.

(Magna

(Trans, p. 62)
1980 to 1082 anode department general foreman.

(Magna

smelter) (Trans. P. 63)
g.

1982 to 1984-85 material handling general foreman.

(Magna smelter)
h.

(Trans, p. 63)

During plant shutdown in 1985-86, assigned

non-supervisory "fire watch" duties and environmental
-8-

department duties.
i.

(Magna smelter)

(Trans, p. 65-66)

1987 to 1988 anode plant foreman.

(Magna smelter)

(Trans, p. 78)
j.

1988 material handling general foreman.

(Trans, p.

k.

1988 to January 31, 1989 operations general foreman.

79)

(Bonneville concentrator) (Trans, p. 80)
In all of the positions held by Plaintiff from between
mid-1974 until his termination in 1989, one of his principal
duties included the discipline of subordinate personnel.
(Trans, p. 105) To facilitate this duty, Plaintiff and other
company managers were required to attend numerous management
training seminars which provided instruction pertaining to the
discipline of employees.

(Trans, p. Ill, 113)

Plaintiff attended the first of such seminars in May 1974.
(Trans, p. 113)

The company sponsored seminar was held at the

Travelodge Motel in Salt Lake City, Utah and taught by
employees of Defendant's human resources department.

(Trans,

p. 110, 113, 114, 390) At the seminar, Plaintiff and others in
attendance were instructed that Defendant's policy of
progressive discipline, i.e., the use of verbal and written
warnings, suspension, termination, and hearings, was to be
applied to all employees.

(Trans, p. Ill, 114)

The second seminar attended by Plaintiff was also held in
1974.

The seminar was taught in the Magna smelter by human
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resources representatives, Gene Bryant and Sid Hollinger, and
as a refresher course to the earlier Travelodge seminar.
(Trans. 116-117, 392) The instruction given Plaintiff with
respect to employee discipline was consistent with the
materials taught at the Travelodge seminar.

(Trans, p.

116-117)
Plaintiff testified that in 1976 he attended a third
seminar taught by smelter maintenance superintendent, Gerald
Hansen, and employee relations director, Sid Hollinger.
(Trans, p. 118-119)

This seminar was held in the Magna smelter

and included the topic of employee discipline.

(Trans, p. 119)

The instruction relating to progressive discipline was
consistent with earlier training given Plaintiff with no
distinction made that progressive discipline was limited in
application to hourly and union employees.

(Trans, p. 120)

The instruction provided in the 1976 seminar served to confirm
Plaintiff's understanding, gained at the time of his hiring,
that progressive discipline was to apply to all employees.
(Trans, p. 120)
Plaintiff testified to a fourth seminar which he attended
during the 1982-83 time frame and which was also held in the
Magna smelter.

(Trans, p. 120) The seminar was taught by

smelter operations general foreman, Jack Haymond, and smelter
maintenance general foreman, Wayne Johnson.

(Trans, p. 121)

The topic of employee discipline was covered and supplemented
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by a videotape presentation of management/leadership styles.
(Trans, p. 121) One of the videotapes depicted supervisors
disciplining other supervisors.

(Trans, p. 121-122)

Plaintiff

testified that the videotape reinforced his understanding that
progressive discipline applied to him and other salary
employees.

(Trans, p. 121-122) During the seminar, no mention

was made that progressive discipline was limited to hourly
employees or that salary/supervisory employees were employees
at-will.

(Trans, p. 122, 123)

Plaintiff attended a fifth company sponsored seminar at
the Airport Hilton Hotel in 1983-84.

(Trans, p. 123) This

seminar was taught by Defendant's employees, Gene Bryant, Wayne
Johnson and Jack Haymond, and included the topic of employee
discipline.

(Trans, p. 123) Defendant's training as to the

use and application of progressive discipline was consistent
with earlier instruction with no exclusions relating to salary
employees.

(Trans, p. 123, 125)

In 1986 Plaintiff was asked by smelter manager, Stewart
Smith, to teach Defendant's "Fresh Start" program.

(Trans, p.

125) Attendance in the "Fresh Start" program was required for
all salary and hourly employees who were called back to work
after Defendant's shutdown in

1984-85.

(Trans, p. 125)

Plaintiff taught the "Fresh Start" course every week for almost
a year or approximately fifty times in all.

(Trans, p. 416)

The program was designed to eliminate the adversarial
-11-

relationship previously existing in the company and to attain
greater consistency in managing employees,
513)

(Trans, p. 512,

During the "Fresh Start" presentation, returning

employees were frequently addressed by plant manager, Burgess
Winter.

(Trans, p. 128) Winter represented to those in

attendance that all employees would be informed of performance
deficiencies and that all employees would otherwise be informed
if their performance was "good or bad".
130)

(Trans, p. 128, 129,

Plaintiff understood Winter's comments to apply to

supervisors because supervisors were in attendance.

(Trans, p.

130)
Plaintiff testified to a sixth company seminar held in May
1988.

Plaintiff did not attend the seminar but was given the

seminar Management Training Manual by smelter maintenance
superintendent, Gerald Hansen.
3. & 4.

(Trans, p. 411, 412, 416)

Oral representations and historical practice with

respect to the application of progressive discipline
During the entire fifteen years of his employment,
Plaintiff was repeatedly told by senior management and other
agents of Defendant that he and other supervisory employees
were entitled to progressive discipline prior to discipline or
discharge.

(Trans, p. 54, 57-58, 110-111, 129-130, 140-144,

174-177, 536-537, 545, 547-548) The communications to
Plaintiff defined and required the historical practice and
conduct engaged in by the parties in disciplining salary
employees.
-12-

A chart reflecting the hierarchal structure of management
in the Magna smelter was introduced at trial as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 30.

(Trans, p. 104)

It is reproduced here for

illustrative purposes only and to assist in establishing the
general chain of command in Plaintiff's smelter employment:

GENERAL MANAGER
74
75
79
80
82
84
88

-

75
79
80
82
84
88

B.
R.
P.
W.
K.
B.
R.

Smith
Pratt
Hunter
Jensen
Vance
Winter
Davies
i ii

urn • •

SMELTER MANAGER
74 - 75
75 - 76
76 - 86
86
86 - 88

I). K inneberg
?. Jensen
II. Andersen
r. H ansen
c>. Smith
1

OPERATIONS SUPT.
75-76
76-86
86-88

111!

•

MAINTENA NCE SUPT.

R. Andersen
D. Mikich
J. Hansen

74 - 76
76 - 86
86 - 88

j

G. Deneris
J. Hansen
k.

]

Supulveda

i

i

•

•

•!

GENERAL .FOREMEN
(operations)
K.
J.
T.
J.

Sorenson
Haymond
Beyersdorf
T. Coon

GENERAL 3FOREMEN
(maintenance)

1.3-

G.
B.
W.
G.

Jones
Hauser
Johnson
Whitehouse

i n n

• • >

1
1
1

Plaintiff testified that during his employment he received
oral instruction and informal management training on a
day-to-day basis or as the situation arose.

(Trans, p. 130)

He testified that most of the informal training, which included
instruction on the application of Defendant's disciplinary
policy, emanated from the smelter's employee relations
department and conveyed by Sid Hollinger, Gene Bryant and
Messrs. Sequin and Ludwig.

(Trans, p. 131)

Plaintiff stated

that he had many discussions with Bryant which addressed the
application of progressive discipline to supervisory employees.
(Trans, p. 132, 134) Other instruction was received by
Plaintiff from senior smelter management as outlined infra.
With respect to Defendant's historical practice of
applying progressive discipline to supervisory employees,
Plaintiff testified to a number of specific instances.
Plaintiff recalled that in approximately 1979-80, a Mr.
Stireman (foreman) and a Mr. Chesley (anode foreman) were given
verbal and written warnings by general foreman, Coon.

(Trans,

p. 137, 151, 153) The disciplinary problems relating to these
two foremen were discussed in a meeting at which Plaintiff,
smelter manager, Bob Anderson, maintenance superintendent,
Gerald Hansen, and general foremen, Mikich, Haymond, Coon,
Hauser, and Johnson, were present.

(Trans, p. 135)

Because

general foreman, Coon, had already given Stireman and Chesley
verbal and written warnings, the topic was raised and discussed
-14-

as to how the next step, i.e., suspension, would be handled.
(Trans, p. 137)
Plaintiff recalled a conversation which took place in
general foreman Mikich1s office in which Plaintiff, Mikich and
general foreman, Coon, discussed the suspension of a salary
employee.

(Trans, p. 138)

Plaintiff additionally testified that he was personally
aware that a Mr. Corona (service general foreman) was given
verbal and written warnings for sleeping on the job and for
failure to adequately supervise, (Trans, p. 154), that a Mr.
Cottrell (maintenance foreman) was given verbal and written
warnings for a safety violation and a suspension for failing to
correct his behavior, (Trans, p. 154-156), that a Mr. Callahan
(service foreman) was given verbal and written warnings by
plant manager, Stewart Smith, for performance problems, (Trans,
p. 156-157), that a Mr. Salazar was given a verbal and written
warning from plant manager, Stewart Smith for performance
problems, (Trans, p. 157-158), and that a Glenn Whitehouse
(electrical general foreman) was given verbal and written
warnings, suspension and finally termination for alcohol abuse.
(Trans, p. 158-159)
Plaintiff testified that he attended a meeting in 1987
which included smelter manager, Stewart Smith, superintendents,
Gerald Hansen and Dallas Mikich, and general foremen, Jack
Haymond, Wayne Johnson, Bob House and Tom Beyersdorf.
-15-

(Trans.

p. 139)

This meeting was held shortly after Stewart Smith had

been named smelter manager and was called to discuss management
concepts, including disciplinary policy, that would be used in
the smelter.

(Exhibit 2, Smith depo. p. 10, 11, 12)

Because Smith was unaware of any written policy governing
the discipline of salary employees, in the meeting he asked
what procedure was being used to discipline supervisory
personnel.

(Trans, p. 139, Exhibit 2, Smith depo. p. 12)

Smith was informed by Gerald Hansen that supervisors were given
progressive discipline, which consisted of hearings, verbal and
written warnings, suspension, and finally, termination if all
preceding steps failed.

(Trans, p. 140)

During this meeting Smith specifically communicated to
those present that, if they did not perform properly, they
would be told of their "shortcomings" and given the opportunity
to "mend their ways".

(Exhibit 2, Smith depo. p. 13)

He went

on to assure the persons in the meeting that if initial verbal
counseling did not work then the employee should be given a
written warning.

(Exhibit 2, Smith depo. p. 13)

In his deposition, which was introduced at trial as
Defendants Exhibit 41, (Trans, p. 653) Smith was asked what
procedure he would follow if a supervisory employee committed a
more serious violation, such as theft or ingesting alcohol on
company property.

(Exhibit 2, Smith depo. p. 14)

Smith's

response paralleled the existing procedure for progressive
-16-

discipline.

"If a serious offense occurred, the individual

would be sent home, and I would have then taken the opportunity
to review the circumstances with my superior and with the human
resources people, to decide on an appropriate course of
action."

(Exhibit 2, Smith depo. p. 14)

Plaintiff testified that in another meeting held sometime
after the one just mentioned, Stewart Smith instructed
supervisors that when disciplining salary employees, verbal
warnings should be limited in number, and if ineffective,
written warnings should be issued.

(Trans, p. 140, 143)

The communications that were made in the two meetings with
smelter manager, Stewart Smith, reinforced Plaintiff's belief
that he was entitled the procedures of progressive discipline
as represented.

(Trans, p. 141)

Plaintiff's personal experience in disciplining
supervisory subordinates involved issuing verbal warnings to
foreman, Ben Smith, (Trans, p. 146) and foreman, Dave Bairline,
for their failure to adequately supervise their subordinates.
(Trans, p. 147)

Plaintiff documented the disciplinary action

taken in his logbook and in the file on each foreman.

(Trans,

p. 148)
Plaintiff was given no authority to deviate from
Defendant's policy of applying progressive discipline to
supervisory personnel.

In this regard he testified to three

statements, one by Dallas Mikich and two from Gerald Hansen in
-17-

which this policy was clearly communicated.

(Trans, p. 174,

176, 177)
The first statement occurred in 1976-77 in the office of
operations superintendent, Dallas Mikich.

(Trans, p. 174)

In

the presence of Plaintiff and the other operating general
foremen, Mikich stated that progressive discipline was to be
"strictly" applied to all employees.

(Trans, p. 175)

The second statement occurred during a meeting in the
office of Gerald Hansen in the late 1970's.

(Trans, p. 176)

At this time, Plaintiff held the position of anode general
foreman and Hansen was in the senior management position of
operations superintendent.

(Trans, p. 176)

The meeting was

attended by two other operating general foremen.
176)

(Trans, p.

Hansen specifically instructed those present that they

were to follow progressive discipline; that employees needed to
be made aware of their shortcomings; that he didn't want them
to "flock shoot" out there; that they were to make sure that
they documented verbal and written warnings so that people knew
what was expected of them and what would happen if the
supervisor's performance continued to be poor.

(Trans, p.

176-177)
The third communication occurred in 1988 and in the
context of the suspension of salary employee, Don Cottrell.
(Trans, p. 176)

During this period, Hansen held the position

of operations superintendent and Plaintiff the position of
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operating general foreman.

(Trans, p. 176) Hansen stated to

Plaintiff and the other operating general foremen present that
every employee was entitled to the disciplinary procedure of
verbal and written warnings, suspensions, etc., and that
Plaintiff and other general foremen did not need to worry about
"someone walking in at some time and firing them or terminating
them without having been told beforehand . . .", or without
being provided preliminary discipline.

(Trans, p. 177)

Plaintiff's testimony was fully and credibly corroborated
through the testimony of Gerald Hansen.
By way of background, Mr. Hansen began his employment with
Defendant as a part-time employee in the Magna smelter in 1966,
1967 and 1968.

(Trans, p. 479-480)

disciplinary duties in 1968.

He first began exercising

(Trans, p. 480-481) After

graduating from the University of Utah in 1969, (B.S.
mechanical engineering) Hansen was hired by Defendant full-time
in 1970.

(Trans, p. 481) Thereafter and until leaving

Defendant's employment on September 15, 1989, (Trans, p. 485),
Hansen held the following positions in the Magna smelter:
(a)
485-486)

Shop support foreman, 1970 to 1973 (Trans, p.

(b) Field repair general foreman, 1973 to January 1977
(Trans, p. 486)
(c) Maintenance superintendent, January 1977 to January
1987 (Trans, p. 486)
(d) Acting plant manager, January 1987 to June 1987
(Trans, p. 486, 545-546)
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(e) Operations superintendent, June 1987 to August 1988
(Trans, p. 486, 568)
(f) Manager of engineering projects, August 1988 to
September 1989 (Trans, p. 486)
In 1975, Hansen became involved in the development and
teaching of management training to Defendant's supervisory
employees including Plaintiff.

(Trans, p. 489)

Hansen was

personally instrumental in developing Defendant's policy
governing employee discipline.

(Trans, p. 490)

At seminars, Hansen taught that Defendant's progressive
discipline policy was "impartial" and akin to a "hot stove",
i.e., anyone who violated the rules of conduct would be
"burned".

(Trans, p. 492)

Hansen taught that progressive

discipline was corrective not punitive in nature, that proper
discipline reguired clear communication of expectations to
ensure that employees knew what was expected of them, that
certain violations (e.g., fighting and drinking on the job)
could lead to immediate termination and that individual
employees were to be treated with dignity and respect.

(Trans,

p. 494)
Of vital importance to the instant case, Hansen testified
that company discipline relating to inadequate performance
would be corrective in nature and that the company, after
giving notice of deficiencies, would work with the employee to
improve performance.

(Trans, p. 495)

Hansen also testified

that employees having performance problems were entitled to
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"just cause" before being terminated—ordinarily meaning that
termination was imposed as a last resort and only after less
severe steps in the progressive discipline scheme had been
implemented and found ineffectual.

(Trans, p. 496)

Hansen

stated that he taught supervisors to look at the offense and
then decide what discipline was appropriate.

(Trans, p. 588)

Hansen testified that the first step in the process of
progressive discipline involved verbally counseling the
individual employee.

(Trans, p. 496)

If the problem

persisted, then stronger measures, either verbal or written
warnings should appropriately be given.

(Trans, p. 497) If

the preceding steps failed to correct the problem, then
suspension with or without pay could be imposed and, if all
else failed, the employee could be terminated.

(Trans, p. 497)

Hansen testified that he first began teaching the policy
of progressive discipline to smelter frontline foremen, general
foremen and plant managers over a four month period in 1975,
(Trans, p. 497, 498) and specifically taught that the procedure
applied to all employees, including supervisory employees.
(Trans, p. 496, 499)
When asked if he knew how long smelter supervision had
been subject to progressive discipline, Hansen testified that
the practice was already in existence when he began working
there in 1970.

(Trans, p. 500)

Hansen not only taught the above principles of progressive
-21-

discipline to employees in the Utah Copper Division but also
taught the course to Defendant's employees in the Nevada Mines
Division and in Tucson, Arizona as well.

(Trans, p. 509)

Hansen testified that, while employed in the smelter,
discussions pertaining to the application of progressive
discipline to supervisory employees were engaged in "as a
matter of course", (Trans, p. 532) and that supervisory
employees were told that they were entitled to progressive
discipline on a "routine basis".

(Trans, p. 536-538)

Hansen

explained that many of these discussions took place in
regularly scheduled Thursday morning meetings attended by all
smelter management, including Plaintiff, (Trans, p. 532, 533)
and the purpose of discussing discipline was to ensure
consistency of discipline in the plant and division.
p. 534)

(Trans,

Hansen testified that at no time during employment was

he told that the principles of progressive discipline were to
be confined to hourly/union employees.

(Trans, p. 519)

Hansen testified to numerous discussions involving the
application of progressive discipline to smelter management
employees.

They are as follows:

(a) Discussion occurring in 1987-88 involving the
termination of a supervisory employee, a Mr. Lindsey, who had
been caught stealing scaffolding.

(Trans, p. 534, 535)

(b) Two discussions in the smelter conference room on two
separate occasions, relating to the suspension of salary
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employee, Don Cottrell.

(Trans, p. 539) The first involved a

discussion as to whether the progressive step of suspension was
appropriate discipline where Cottrell had committed a
"reckless" and unsafe act.

(Trans, p. 540, 562)

During this

meeting, newly appointed smelter manager, Stewart Smith,
inquired as to the means by which salary employees were being
disciplined.

(Trans, p. 540) As referenced, supra, Hansen

explained that progressive discipline constituted the
historical practice used in this regard.

(Trans, p. 540) The

second discussion occurred approximately two weeks later,
(Trans, p. 542, 543) and again involved whether Cottrell should
be suspended under the policy of progressive discipline.
(Trans, p. 543-544) When Hansen was questioned whether Smith
ever instructed him to discontinue the practice of applying
progressive discipline to salary employees, Hansen testified
that Smith had not.

(Trans, p. 542)

(c) Discussions relating to Hansen's application of
progressive discipline to electrical general foreman, Glenn
Whitehouse.

(Trans, p. 537, 554) Hansen testified that he was

Whitehouse's immediate supervisor and that the application of
progressive discipline to Whitehouse for poor performance was
specifically discussed with human resources employee, Gene
Bryant, in 1985.

(Trans. 551, 553, 555)

Hansen's discussion

with Bryant involved reviewing the need to apply the initial
steps of verbal counseling to Whitehouse.
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(Trans, p. 552)

Hansen testified that the disciplinary steps subsequently
afforded Whitehouse consisted of (1) verbal counseling and a
six month opportunity to correct performance; (Trans, p. 554),
(2) providing Whitehouse with written notice of performance
deficiencies in his annual performance evaluation; (Trans, p.
555), (3) Hansen and Gene Bryant issuing Whitehouse a written
warning which stated, "if your performance does not improve,
you will be terminated"; (Trans, p. 555), (4) a copy of the
written notice placed in Whitehouse's personnel file and a copy
sent to smelter manager, Bob Anderson; (Trans, p. 555), (5)
suspension; (Trans, p. 555), and, (6) ultimately termination.
(Trans, p. 555)

Hansen further testified that the underlying

purpose of applying progressive discipline to Whitehouse and
other supervisory employees was to give the employee a chance
to correct problem behavior, demonstrate that individuals in
the company were important and because of the Defendant's
investment in its supervisory personnel, to utilize termination
only as a last resort.

(Trans, p. 556)

(d) Perhaps the most compelling portion of Hansen's
testimony pertained to his specific communications to
Plaintiff.

Hansen testified that in 1987 he was Plaintiff's

immediate supervisor and specifically instructed Plaintiff to
apply progressive discipline to Plaintiff's supervisory
subordinates.

(Trans, p. 545-547)

Hansen also testified that

he made it clear to Plaintiff that the implementation of this
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disciplinary policy was not discretionary because Defendant's
purpose was to achieve "uniformity in how discipline was
applied throughout the organization".

(Trans, p. 547)

Hansen

went on to state that Plaintiff's failure to provide other
supervisors with progressive discipline could have caused
Plaintiff to have been disciplined himself.

(Trans, p.

547-548)
Hansen testified that, during his employment with
Defendant, he was personally aware that progressive discipline
had been received by the following employees:

(1) maintenance

foreman, Bryan Booth, given a verbal warning by general
foreman, Bob Houser, in 1981-82; (Trans, p. 559-560), (2)
service foreman, Steve Poulsen, given verbal and written
warnings for poor performance by his general foreman in 1987;
(Trans, p. 560-561), (3) anode foreman, Lynn Belka, given
verbal and written warnings by his general foreman, Ken
Britton, in 1987, 1989; (Trans, p. 561), (4) maintenance
foreman, Don Cottrell, suspended by maintenance superintendent,
Al Supulveda; (Trans, p. 565), (5) maintenance foreman, Ron
Carlson, given a verbal warning by Gerald Hansen for poor
performance; (Trans, p. 563), and, (6) maintenance foreman,
Clyde Andrus, given a verbal warning by Gerald Hansen in
1982-83.

(Trans, p. 563)

Hansen stated that the discipline of supervision was done
quietly and not generally publicized or announced plant wide
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for fear of jeopardizing respect for supervisors and impairing
their ability to lead subordinate employees.

(Trans, p. 556)

Plaintiff's and Hansen's testimony was corroborated by
that of former smelter general foreman, Tracy Johnson.
Mr. Johnson testified that he was employed by Defendant
from between February 5, 1979, to July 25, 1989.
626)

(Trans, p.

He worked in the Magna smelter during two periods;

initially from between February 1979 to October 1981 and again
from October 1986 to the time of his discharge in July 1989.
(Trans, p. 627) While in the smelter, Johnson held the
positions of maintenance engineer and material handling general
foreman, (Trans, p. 628) both roles requiring the discipline of
subordinates when necessary.

(Trans, p. 628)

During his examination, Johnson was asked whether
Defendant applied a policy of progressive discipline to
supervisory personnel.

(Trans, p. 630) Johnson responded

affirmatively and stated that he gained such a knowledge
through attendance in a series of management courses and
observing the "general procedures that were utilized in the
plant".

(Trans, p. 631, 636)

With respect to management training, Johnson testified
that he was required to attend two company seminars, one at the
Airport Hilton in February 1979, (Trans, p. 631), and another
in 1988.

(Trans, p. 633) At both seminars Johnson received

instruction on the nature and use of progressive discipline and
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recalled no mention made that progressive discipline was solely
limited to hourly employees.

(Trans, p. 635)

Johnson testified to specific instances when progressive
discipline was applied to supervisory employees.
The first involved Johnson having to discipline one of his
subordinate foremen, Ben Smith, for inadequate performance in
September 1988.

(Trans, p. 639-641) The matter was discussed

with Smith and Johnson's supervisor, Ken Britton.
639, 640)

(Trans, p.

Britton instructed Johnson to initially issue Smith

a verbal warning and, if ineffective, to follow it up with a
written warning stating Smith's performance problem.

(Trans,

p. 640-641)
Johnson further testified that, in a regularly scheduled
meeting, he participated in a discussion relating to the
progressive discipline of a foreman under the supervision of
Steve Bailey.

(Trans, p. 641)

Johnson stated that he had been progressively disciplined
in December 1988 by being given a written warning of inadequate
job performance.

(Trans, p. 643-644)

Johnson additionally

testified to being present during discussions relating to the
progressive discipline of Don Cottrell, (Trans, p.

644-645)

and being told by Gerald Hansen that progressive steps of
discipline would be applied to supervisory personnel.
p. 646)
5.

Defendant's use of annual performance evaluations
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(Trans,

Plaintiff testified that one means used to provide warning
to salary employees of inadequate or unsatisfactory performance
was through Defendant's use of performance evaluations.
(Trans, p. 179, 555) Management employees could expect to be
evaluated on an annual basis and the results used for such
things as notification of performance problems, raises in
salaries and promotions.

(Trans, p. 178-179, 555) At trial,

Plaintiff introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits 7,
8, and 9, his performance evaluations for the years 1982, 1987
and 1988.

(Plaintiff's 1982, 1987 and 1988 Performance

Evaluations, attached hereto as Exhibit 3, Trans, p. 181-182,
277) All reflected satisfactory performance including
Plaintiff's 1988 evaluation conducted approximately three
months before his termination.

When asked how he rated his own

performance while employed by Defendant, Plaintiff testified
that he had not once been disciplined for violations of the
rules and at all times believed his performance to have been
"excellent".

(Trans, p. 185-186)

Plaintiff's testimony regarding the use of performance
evaluations to notify management employees of performance
problems was corroborated in the testimony of witness, Gerald
Hansen.

Hansen testified that, in the application of

progressive discipline of electrical general foreman, Glenn
Whitehouse, Hansen included statements in Whitehouse's
performance evaluation that, "he had to improve his performance
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in order to retain his current position".

(Trans, p. 555)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, the trial Court erred
in finding that, (1) no discussion occurred at the time of
Plaintiff's hiring rebutting the presumption that Plaintiff was
hired at-will; and, (2) that the 1973 General Rules of Conduct
failed to establish an implied term and condition of
Plaintiff's employment.

(Order and Judgment of Dismissal,

Findings of Fact, paras. 1(a) and 4, attached hereto as Exhibit
4).
The trial Court failed to properly consider Plaintifffs
testimony regarding his conversations with human resources
employees, Charles Bird and Gene Bryant, which were engaged in
at or about the time of Plaintiff's firing.

The

representations by Bird and Bryant relating to the use and
application of the 1973 General Rules of Conduct can only be
interpreted as providing Plaintiff with protection from
arbitrary discipline or discharge and promising something other
than at-will employment.
The trial Court failed to properly interpret the
Defendant's policy statement entitled "General Rules of
Conduct", signed by Plaintiff and his supervisor, D.A.
Kinneberg.

The trial Court should have construed the General

Rules of Conduct as an offer and acceptance to limit
Defendant's right to discipline Plaintiff or terminate his
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employment for any or no reason.

The effect of such a finding

would have precluded dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint under
Rule 41(b) of the URCP.
The trial Court erred in finding that Defendant's long
time practice of applying the principles of progressive
discipline to Plaintiff and other mid-level supervisory
employees was simply "good management" as opposed to
constituting a binding contractual term of Plaintiff's
employment.

(Exhibit 4, Findings of Fact, para. 1(b))

Defendant's practice, which was consistent with the
language contained in the 1973 General Rules of Conduct, was
required to be implemented by Plaintiff and applied to
Plaintiff's supervisory subordinates.
The lower Court found that the disciplinary procedures
applicable to supervisory employees were less formally applied
than those for hourly employees under the collective bargaining
agreement.

(Exhibit 4, Findings of Fact, para. 1(b))

This

finding is irrelevant and misses the point when analyzed
against the testimony of Plaintiff, Gerald Hansen and Tracy
Johnson.

Even if the procedures used with respect to

supervisory employees were somewhat different than those
contained in the collective bargaining agreement, there
nevertheless existed a separate procedure limiting Defendant's
right to terminate Plaintiff's employment for any or no reason.
Plaintiff has never claimed that he was entitled to the
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progressive discipline procedure found in the collective
bargaining agreement•

Rather, Plaintiff's claim is based on

Defendant's historical course of conduct, and its unilateral
decision to extend and apply progressive discipline to
supervisory employees.
Moreover, Plaintifffs failure to apply principles of
progressive discipline to other salary employees under his
supervision could have subjected him to discipline for failure
to follow company policy.

Under all the circumstances, the

belief that he was entitled to progressive discipline prior to
termination can hardly be construed as a subjective figment of
Plaintiff's imagination.
In reaching its conclusions, the trial Court inexplicably
disregarded the testimony of Plaintiff's supervisor, Gerald
Hansen, which included that, (1) it was Defendant's historical
practice to apply progressive discipline to Plaintiff and other
supervisory personnel; (2) Hansen had told Plaintiff that he
was entitled to progressive discipline prior to discipline or
discharge; (3) Plaintiff was required to apply the progressive
discipline policy to Plaintiff's subordinates; and, (4)
Plaintiff could have been disciplined for failure to implement
the policy of progressive discipline as instructed.
In reaching its conclusions, the trial Court also
disregarded the credible testimony of witness, Tracy Johnson,
which included knowledge that progressive discipline was
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applied to supervisory personnel and that he had experienced
such discipline himself.
ARGUMENT
I, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41 (b) OF
THE URCP.
A.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF EXISTING LAW
In the seminal case of Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd, 771

P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989), this Court recognized that the
existence of an implied-in-fact contract can rebut the
presumption that an employee is hired at-will.

"The at-will

rule, after all, is merely a rule of contract construction and
not a legal principle,"

Id.

"The rule creates a presumption

that any employment which has no specified term of duration is
an at-will relationship."

Id.

"This presumption can be overcome by an affirmative
showing by the plaintiff that the parties expressly or
impliedly intended a specified term or agreed to terminate the
relationship for cause alone."

Id.

"Such evidence may be

found in employment manuals, oral agreements, and all
circumstances of the relationship which demonstrate the intent
to terminate only for cause or to continue employment for a
specified period."

(emphasis added) Id.

The course of the parties' performance can be significant
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in determining the terms or meaning of an [implied] agreement,
Id. at 1342, (obtain cite) and in employment termination cases,
the mere claim of an employer that it did not intend to be
bound contractually has been found insufficient to prevent
contract formation.

Courts will therefore measure the

employer's intent by the reasonable interpretation of its words
and actions under all the circumstances.

Rose v. Allied

Development Co., 719 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1986).
Courts have been hesitant to limit the spectrum of
circumstances that may support the formation of an
implied-in-fact contract, Berube, supra, at 1045, and factors
which have been found relevant include, the personnel policies
or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of
service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting
assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the
industry in which the employee is engaged.
1045,

Berube, supra at

[Berube court citing, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171

Cal.Rptr. 917 (App. 1981)].
In cases since Berube, the Utah Supreme Court has
specifically held that implied contracts can arise from
employee manuals and bulletins containing policies for employee
termination, Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,
1000 (Utah 1991); employment manuals and unilateral statements
of policy practice and procedure, Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon &
Davis, 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989); oral statements, Sanderson v.
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First Security Leasing, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1992); and
oral statements and conduct of the employer, Hodgson v. Bunzi
Utah, Inc., 202 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah 1993).
Significantly, in the recent case of Thurston v. Box Elder
County, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (Utah 1992) the Court
recognized that intangible as well as tangible circumstances
should be examined to determine the intent of the parties:

Therefore we hold that if an employer,
for whatever reason, creates an
atmosphere of job security and fair
treatment with promises of specific
treatment in specific situations and an
employee is induced to thereby remain on
the job and not actively seek other
employment, those promises are components
of the employment relationship.
(Emphasis added).
In the case of Thurston v. Box Elder County, 191 Utah Adv.
Rep. 27, 29 (1992), this Court firmly established that,
"employees have the right to rely on the layoff and termination
procedures advanced by their employers". This right arguably
stems from ineguities freguently found in the relationship
between employee and employer.
Within the confines of existing law, employers are
acknowledged to possess the right to organize and operate their
business as they see fit. Because most employees work at-will,
this clearly includes, with some limitation, the right to hire
and fire for any reason or no reason in accordance with the
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vagaries of the marketplace.

Though perhaps grounded in

economic necessity, treatment of at-will employees is often
unfair and can result in extraordinary economic hardship.
A growing number of courts have decided that, where
contractual rights and obligations are created, whether
expressed or implied, at-will status is rebutted and the
parties will be bound accordingly.

This position rests on the

assumption that it is the employer who has control to either
create or abolish at-will status.

If the employer,

unilaterally or otherwise, establishes policies that are
justifiably relied upon by the employee the employer cannot
later disavow the same without incurring legal liability.
This viewpoint is recognized in Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1984), a case cited with
approval in Thurston v. Box Elder County, 191 Utah Adv. Rep.
27, 29 (1992).

The Thompson court observed:

"Where the employment relationship is not
evidenced by a written contract and is
indefinite in duration the parties have
entered into a contract whereby the
employer is essentially obligated to only
pay the employee for any work performed.
In this contractual relationship the
employer exercises substantial control
over both the working relationship and
his employees by retaining independent
control of the work relationship. Thus
the employer can define the work
relationship. Once the employer takes
unilateral action it is bound . . . "
In support of its dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, the
trial Court relied on the findings that, (1) there was no
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discussion at the time of hiring which rebutted the presumption
that Plaintiff was hired at-will; (Exhibit 4, Findings of Fact,
paras. 1(a)), (2) the provisions of the 1973 General Rules of
Conduct were insufficient to rebut the presumption that
Plaintiff was hired at-will; (Exhibit 4, Findings of Fact,
para. 4 ) , (3) that Defendant's long term practice of applying
the principles of progressive discipline to Plaintiff and other
supervisory employees was simply "good management" and never
part of an employment contract; (Exhibit 4, Findings of Fact,
para. 1(b)), and, (4) that Plaintiff otherwise failed to bear
its burden of proof in establishing the existence of an implied
contract requiring progressive discipline prior to termination.
(Exhibit 4, Conclusions of Law, paras. 1 and 2)
The lower Court's findings and dismissal in this regard
are erroneous because they are contrary to existing law and
ignore this Court's admonition in Berube, supra, at 1044, that
"rigid adherence to the at-will principle is no longer
advisable".
At trial, Plaintiff had the burden of establishing the
existence of an implied-in-fact contract of employment and that
his employment was something other than "at-will". Berube,
supra at 1044. Plaintiff presented a wealth of evidence
supporting its contention that Defendant had unilaterally
obligated itself to discharge him only for cause and only after
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exhausting a process of progressive discipline.

Plaintiff

maintains that significant portions of its evidence were
ignored by the trial Court in dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint
and in otherwise finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy its
burden of proof.
In the case of Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d
997, 1002 (Utah 1991) this Court identified the specific
elements necessary to establish the requisite "affirmative
showing".

The Court held that "for an implied-in-fact contract

term to exist, it must meet the requirements for an offer of a
unilateral contract".

The Court additionally held that such an

offer includes, (1) a manifestation of intent; (2) communicated
to the employee; (3) sufficiently definite to operate as a
contract provision; and, (4) the manifestation must be of a
sort that causes the employee to reasonably believe that his
employment is something other than "at-will".
During trial, and as hereinafter set forth, Plaintiff
presented evidence which clearly satisfied all of the
requirements identified in Johnson, supra, needed to establish
an implied-in-fact contract and to avoid dismissal under Rule
41(b) URCP.
In the case before this Court, manifestations of the
parties intent include, (1) Defendant's 1973 General Rules of
Conduct, signed by the parties; (2) Defendant's management
training and materials received by Plaintiff during his
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employment; (3) specific oral instruction from Defendant that
progressive discipline was applicable to Plaintiff and other
supervisory personnel; (4) Defendant's historical application
of progressive discipline to supervisory personnel; and, (5)
Defendant's use of annual performance evaluations.
When the specifics of the above conduct and behavior are
analyzed in the context of Plaintiff's fifteen year employment,
it is inconceivable that Defendant can now claim that its
termination of Plaintiff, in summary fashion and without
warning, was consistent with its announced policy.

This Court

should therefore reverse the lower Court's dismissal of
Plaintiff's Complaint and find that the parties intended to be
contractually bound to an implied-in-fact contract of
employment guaranteeing Plaintiff a procedure of progressive
discipline before termination for poor performance.
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT'S 1973 "GENERAL CODE OF
CONDUCT", FAILED TO CONSTITUTE AN IMPLIED
TERM AND CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT AND
REBUTTED THE PRESUMPTION THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS HIRED AT-WILL.
Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant on March 25, 1974.
(Trans, p. 50)

Contemporaneous with his hiring, Plaintiff was

interviewed by Defendant's director of human resources, Charles
Bird.

(Trans, p. 51) Mr. Bird presented Plaintiff with

several company documents requiring Plaintiff's signature.
(Trans, p. 53-55)

One was a statement of company policy dated
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July 1, 1973, and entitled "General Rules of Conduct".
p. 53)

(Trans,

Plaintiff was required to sign the General Rules of

Conduct to evidence that he read and understood its contents.
(Trans, p. 53) The policy statement was additionally signed by
Plaintiff's supervisor and smelter plant superintendent, D.A.
Kinneberg.

(Trans, p. 53, Exhibit 1)

Relevant language in the document states that the
enumerated rules, although "not all-inclusive", are "the
general rules of conduct that apply to all Kennecott personnel
while on company operating property".

(Emphasis added),

the

document also states that, "Violation of these rules is cause
for either, (1) written warning; or, (2) suspension subject to
hearing for discipline purposes.

Such a hearing can result in

penalty, layoff or discharge, depending upon the seriousness of
the offense."

(Exhibit 1)

Bird explained to Plaintiff that the General Rules of
Conduct was the means by which violations of company rules
would be addressed.

(Trans, p. 54)

In subsequent interview by

employee relations representative, Gene Bryant, the same
instruction was given, i.e., Plaintiff was expected to follow
the provisions of the Rules of Conduct and that failure to do
so could lead to discipline or discharge.

(Trans, p. 57-58)

In the field of labor relations, the type of disciplinary
scheme as set forth in the General Rules of Conduct, and
utilized by Defendant is commonly known as "progressive
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discipline".

As the name implies, progressive discipline is

implemented in steps which are normally applied in graduated
fashion.

With respect to problems like poor performance, its

overall objective is to correct behavior not to punish the
employee, i.e., by inflicting unreasonably harsh discipline.
(Trans, p. 489-497)
At trial, Plaintiff argued that the provisions contained
in the Rules of Conduct, added to the way in which the policy
was presented to Plaintiff, constituted a clear manifestation
that Plaintiff's employment status was something other than
at-will and that, during his employment, Plaintiff would not be
subject to arbitrary discipline and discharge.

(Trans, p.

352-356)
It is settled law in Utah that policy statements of the
employer, such as Defendant's General Rules of Conduct, can
rebut the presumption of at-will employment.

Lowe v. Sorenson

Research Co. Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989), Caldwell v.
Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989),
and Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1991).
In the case of Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc.,
777 P.2d 483, 485 this Court held that a policy manual
containing "operations bulletins" setting forth specific
termination procedures could be construed as an implied promise
limiting the employer's right to discharge for any or no
reason.

In the Court's decision it was noted that the
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employer's unilateral promises can be binding even in the
absence of a manifestation of mutual assent.

Id. at 485-486.

The facts in the instant case are stronger than those in
Caldwell, supra, because Defendant's General Rules of Conduct
were accompanied with clear expressions of mutual assent.
First, the language in the General Rules of Conduct is
clear and unequivocal and as such constitutes a definite offer;
second, acceptance of the terms contained in the Rules of
Conduct is evidenced by Plaintiff's signature and that of D.A.
Kinneberg; third, Defendant's intended meaning of the
provisions of the Rules of Conduct was communicated to
Plaintiff on two separate occasions by Defendant's human
resources representatives, Charles Bird and Gene Bryant;
fourth, Plaintiff testified that, from the time of his hiring,
he believed he was entitled to a policy of progressive
discipline prior to being terminated from employment; and,
finally, Defendant's subsequent practice in applying
progressive discipline to supervisory personnel was in all ways
consistent with the representations contained in the General
Rules of Conduct.
On the witness stand, Plaintiff testified that there was
never one instance, orally or in writing, which ever
contradicted his understanding that the disciplinary and
termination procedures contained in the 1973 General Rules of
Conduct and the fifteen year practice of applying progressive
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discipline to him and others in like positions had ceased or
been discontinued.

(Trans, p. 110-111, 116-117, 120, 122-123,

130, 140, 144-145, 149-151, 167-168, 171-172, 174-177, 390)
The trial Court's specific finding that there was no
discussion at the time of Plaintiff's hiring that rebutted the
presumption that he was hired at-will is clearly contrary to
the undisputed evidence and ignores Plaintiff's conversations
with Charles Bird and Gene Bryant.

"The construction of

contract terms is an issue of law to be determined by the
court."

Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc., 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23

(Utah 1992).

A reviewing court, however, will not

automatically defer to the trial court's conclusions of law but
instead will review them for correctness.

Southern Title Guar.

Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1988).
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court reverse the
trial Court's conclusion, find that said policy statement
rebuts the presumption that Plaintiff was hired at-will, and
remand this matter for further proceedings as prayed for
herein.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DEFENDANT'S ORAL REPRESENTATIONS AND
HISTORICAL CONDUCT OF APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLES OF PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE TO
PLAINTIFF AND OTHER SUPERVISORY
PERSONNEL WAS MERELY "GOOD MANAGEMENT"
RATHER THAN AN IMPLIED TERM AND
CONDITION OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT.
It is Plaintiff's contention that he was never an employee
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at-will because, at the time of his hiring, Defendant promised
to follow a procedure of progressive discipline as outlined
under the 1973 General Rules of Conduct and at all times
thereafter applied a disciplinary policy which was consistent
with the 1973 Rules of Conduct.
In the alternative, even if the circumstances surrounding
the 1973 General Rules of Conduct did not rebut the presumption
that Plaintiff was hired at-will, Plaintiff's status was
subsequently defined through Defendant's practice of applying
progressive discipline to Plaintiff and other
salary/supervisory employees.

(For sake of brevity, Plaintiff

will not repeat the extensive body of evidence presented at
trial and contained in the "Relevant Facts" section of
Plaintiff's brief herein.)
The trial Court found that Defendant's historical practice
in this regard was merely "good management".

With this,

Plaintiff does not take issue. The implementation of an
orderly and "corrective" disciplinary policy vis-a-vis
Defendant's supervisory personnel no doubt created a positive
effect of the stability and morale of Defendant's salary work
force.
The trial Court's additional finding however, that
Defendant's management policy did not create an implied term of
Plaintiff's employment, is disputed.

The question is whether

the Defendant engaged in a course of oral representations and
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conduct that estops it from now alleging that Plaintiff was
employed at-will.

In the recent case of Sanderson v. First

Security Leasing/ 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah 1992) this
Court observed that,
At-will employment is a bundle of different
privileges, any or all of which an employer
can surrender through an oral agreement.
In addition to a promise for a specified
term or a for-cause requirement for
termination, an employer can, for example,
agree to use a certain procedure for firing
employees or promise not to fire employees
for a certain reason, thereby modifying the
employee's at-will employment.
Defendant's oral representations and conduct caused
Plaintiff to reasonably believe that progressive discipline was
included as a term and condition of his employment.

It does

not follow that a good management practice cannot also
constitute an implied term and condition of one's employment.
Defendant's extensive history of applying progressive
discipline to supervisory employees constitutes a clear
"surrender" of the presumption that Plaintiff was employed
at-will.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
PROPERLY CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY OF
GERALD HANSEN IN FINDING THAT
PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE DID NOT
CONSTITUTE A TERM AND CONDITION IN
PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT.
During trial, Plaintiff testified to his attendance at a
number of meetings and seminars where smelter superintendent,
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Gerald Hansen, communicated company policy and procedure to
those present.

(Trans, p. 116-117, 139-140, 144, 149-151, 174,

176-177) Many of the meetings referred to by Plaintiff were
also attended by senior smelter management, such as smelter
general manager, Stewart Smith, and his predecessor, Bob
Anderson.

(Trans, p. 135-137, 139-140) These upper echelon

managers tacitly or otherwise ratified the representations made
by Hansen to those in attendance.

(Trans p. 519, 548)

The Defendant's employment environment is not
significantly different than most others, in that the Plaintiff
was not free to question the instructions given him by his
superiors.

Likewise, neither could he interrogate his

superiors in order to determine whether an announced policy had
been approved by top level corporate management and/or issued
pursuant to his supervisor's authority.
In the work place, it is generally assumed that one's
supervisor possesses that authority reasonably necessary to
effectively administer and control the tasks at hand.

It is

therefore axiomatic that most employees do what they are told,
must rely on what they are told, and cannot question the
authority of their supervisors without fear of being
disciplined for insubordination.

Plaintiff was no exception.

In all aspects, Plaintiff's testimony was credibly
supported and corroborated by smelter superintendent, Gerald
Hansen.

Hansen testified that he had spent years developing
-45-

and teaching disciplinary policy to Defendant's employees in
Defendant's Utah Division, Nevada Mines Division and to
Defendant's employees in Tucson, Arizona.

(Trans, p. 509)

Hansen additionally testified that the practice of
applying progressive discipline to salary employees was in
existence at the time he was assigned full-time employment in
the Magna smelter in 1970, that, over the years, either as
Plaintiff's immediate supervisor or as senior management, he
had personally represented that Plaintiff and other supervisors
were entitled to progressive discipline prior to being
disciplined or discharged, and that Plaintiff was required to
apply the procedures to his supervisory subordinates or else
risk discipline himself.

(Trans, p. 497-502, 532, 536-537,

545, 547-548, 553)
In further testimony, Hansen stated that his instructions
to Plaintiff and other management employees were based on his
extensive experience in developing Defendant's management
training materials and procedures, and with the overt
acquiescence of the Defendant.

(Trans, p. 541-542, 566-567)

Hansen also stated that he was never told that Plaintiff or
other mid-level supervisors were employed at-will or were not
otherwise entitled to the principles of progressive discipline.
(Trans, p. 519-520, 583-584)
The oral representations, through Hansen and others,
together with the consistent application of progressive
-46-

discipline to Plaintiff's salaried co-employees, (Trans, p.
537-539, 558-565) served to continually reinforce Plaintiff's
belief that he was entitled to progressive discipline.

At the

very least, Defendant's course of conduct created the
"atmosphere" of protected employment referred to by the Court
in Thurston v. Box Elder County, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29
(Utah 1992).
Under principles of agency, the statements and
representations made by Plaintiff's superiors, in the scope and
course of employment, were sufficient to bind the Defendant to
terms of an implied-in-fact contract.
As a senior manager in the Magna smelter, Hansen clearly
had the actual, apparent or ostensible authority to bind
Defendant to an implied-in-fact and/or unilateral contract of
employment with Plaintiff.

The apparent or ostensible

authority of an agent can be inferred only from the acts and
conduct of the principal.

City Electric v. Dean Evans

Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983).
Where corporate liability is sought for acts of its agent
under apparent authority, liability is premised upon the
corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the conduct of
its agents which has led third parties to rely upon the agent's
actions.

Id. at 90. Apparent authority vanishes when the third

party has actual knowledge of the real scope of the agent's
authority.

Id. at 90.
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In this case, smelter general managers, Stewart Smith, and
Smith's predecessor, Bob Anderson, delegated actual authority
to Hansen to communicate the representations made to Plaintiff
and others regarding the application of progressive discipline
to salaried personnel.

Even if actual authority was not

delegated or otherwise transmitted, Hansen was certainly
clothed with apparent authority and his representations to
Plaintiff and others were, in fact, ratified by the smelter
manager, Stewart Smith, and therefore binding.

Plaintiff was

therefore fully entitled to rely on the representations of his
superiors because there was literally no evidence produced
which refuted their statements or the policy of progressive
discipline communicated by them.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
In order to assist the Court in deciding the issues raised
herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests the opportunity to
present oral argument.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint
under Rule 41(b) URCP.

At trial, Plaintiff's evidence

established a right to relief by affirmatively rebutting the
presumption that Plaintiff was hired at-will and otherwise
entitled to a procedure of progressive discipline prior to
being terminated.
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Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
reverse the decision of the trial Court, vacate its Order and
Judgment of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) URCP and remand
this case for further proceedings in accordance with its
decision.

Inasmuch as trial Court Judge, Scott Daniels, has

permanently left the Bench, remand for further proceedings
would necessitate a completely new trial.

Plaintiff, finally

requests reimbursement of his costs on appeal as provided by
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this <2iiH>day of February, 1993.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

RSfflTC.

DAVIS

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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EXHIBIT 1

KEMECOTT COPPER CORPORATION
UTAH COPPER DIVISION

July 1 ,

TO:

1973

ALL UTAH SMELTER EMPLOYEES

SUBJECT: GENERAL RULES OF CONDUCT
FORWARD
All organizations require rules by which to operate efficiently. Without them,
an individual in that organization would be unable to work effectively toward
the organization's goals.
We ^expeci^QTJLJ^nb serve those "common sense" rules of honesty, common decency,
and general conduct always necessary when a large group is working together, so
that the actions of one individual will not be detrimental to other employees, or
to the company.
Listed below are the general rules of conduct" that apply to all Kennecott personnel while on company operating property. These rules are not all-inclusive, but
serve as a guide to good company citizenship.
Violation of these rules is cause for either (l) written warning, or (2) suspension
subject to hearing for discipline purposes. Such a hearing can result in penalty
layoff or discharge, depending upon the seriousness of the offense.
1.

Insubordination is prohibited.

2.

Drinking or being under the influence of or possessing intoxicants is prohibited.

3.

Sleeping during working hours is prohibited.

k*

Fighting is prohibited.

5.

Stealing or hiding of property, materials, or supplies of the company or of
another employee with malicious intent is prohibited. Borrowing, without
permission, is prohibited.

6.

Leaving the job (work place) during working hours without supervisory permission is prohibited.

7.

Distributing literature without permission is prohibited.

8. Violation of safety and operating rules is prohibited.
9.

EXHIBIT

Personal weapons or firearms of any type are prohibited.

KS000569
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10.

Soliciting funds or money, without managerial authorization, i s prohibited.

11.

Interfering with the work of others is prohibited*

12*

Taking pictures vathout management authorization is prohibited.

13-

Destruction or defacing of company property or that of another employee by
willful intent or neglect i s prohibited,

lU.

"Reading during working hours without permission is prohibited.

15.

Gambling i s prohibited.

l6«

Playing cards or other games during working hours is prohibited.

17.

Falsification of records or reports is prohibited.

18.

Horseplay i s prohibited.

19.

Loafing or malingering i s prohibited.

D. A. Kinneberg
C/
Smelter Plant Superintendent

KS000512

EXHIBIT 2

CQpy
Tempest
Reporting, Inc.

Po^t Office Box 3474
Salt LakeCit\, Utah 84110

Telephone
(801)521-5222

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0Civil No. 890905608
(Judge Scott Daniels)

KELLY SORENSON,
Plaintiff,
-vKENNECOTT - UTAH COPPER
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

Deposition of:
STEWART BUTCHART SMITH

Defendant•

-OPlace:

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Utah One Plaza
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah

Date :

August 7, 1991
10; 05 a.m.

Reporter:

Ariel Mumma, CSR/RPR
-0»

gfflith (Examination by Mr. Lee)
1

A.

Mr. Hansen's assignment I believe was

2

senior in charge.

3

maintenance superintendent.

4
5

Q.

His last substantive position was

And did Mr. Hansen start to work under your

guidance right after you came?

6

A.

Yes, he did.

7

Q.

With respect to Mr. Sorenson, did

8

Mr. Sorenson come to work in the smelter under --

9

when you were smelter manager?

10

A.

Yes, he did.

11

Q.

Do you recall about when?

12

A.

I believe it was round about the end

13

of '86.

14

Q.

15
16

And what kind of assignment did

Mr. Sorenson have, if you recall?
A.

Mr. Sorenson at that time would be given

17

responsibilities in the material handling area,

18

again, to the best of my recollection.

19

Q.

After you first came to Kennecott in 1986,

20

did you have a meeting with your supervisor --

21

supervisory personnel, to discuss your management

22

concepts and how you would manage the smelter?

23

A.

Yes, I did.

24

Q.

Do you recall about when that meeting might

25

have been; not an exact date, but --

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222

11
Smith (Examination by Mr. Lee)
1
2

A.

Oh, I would guess within the first couple

of months of my arrival at Kennecott.

3

Q.

So that would have been in the summer

4

of '86?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And do you recall who attended the

7

meeting -- I mean, types of people who would be at

8

the meeting.

9

A.

The people who attended the meeting were

10

the senior s-t-a-f-f w-h-o had been retained to operate the

11

smelter after start-up, people who had worked in the

12

smelter, and who would continue to work in the

13

smelter after start-up.

14
15

Q.

And these would have been people that would

be under your supervision --

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

-- at the smelter?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

During that meeting, do you recall if there

20

were discussions concerning discipline?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Was there discussions concerning the

23

discipline procedure relating to represented

24

employees, those employees under union contracts?

25

A.

It's unlikely there would be any specific

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222

12
Smith (Examination by Mr. Lee)
1

discussion regarding union employee discipline,

2

because that is predetermined by a labor agreement

3

between the unions and the government.

4

Q.

And you were aware of those agreements?

5

A.

I knew the agreement existed, yes.

g

Q.

Did you have a discussion at that time,

7

with the people in the meeting, about discipline with

8

respect to supervisors?

9
fO

A.

I had a discussion regarding behavioral

correction with -supervisory people at that time.

11

Q.

Would these discussions encompass your

12

ideas of how people should be taken care of, if there

13

were behavior problems among supervisors?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

At that time were you aware of any written

16

policies that Kennecott had with respect to

17

supervisors and how they would be disciplined?

18
19
20

A.

I was not aware of any written policy at

Q.

Had you had any discussions with the people

all.

21

that supervised you -- I guess in this case, the

22

general manager of the Utah Copper concerning

23

MR. DAVIS:

24

MR. LEE:

25

MR. DAVIS:

Objection.
-- dis- -- excuse me.
Excuse me.

Objection,

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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13
Smith (Examination by Mr. Lee)
1
^ I

_ _

foundation.
Q.

BY MR. LEE:

Okay.

Who was your immediate

3

supervisor, when you started to work in June of '86,

4

for Kennecott?

5

A.

James Burgess Winter.

g

Q.

And when you came to Kennecott, did you

7

have any discussions with Mr. Winters about how

8

supervisors would be disciplined?

9

A.

No, I did not.

10

Q.

Can you tell us what you. said at that

11

meeting concerning your concept of how -- how

12

behavior problems should be handled?

13

A.

Yes.

Again, to the best of my

14

recollection, the message I communicated to the

15

people in attendance at the meeting was that should

16

somebody be not performing properly, they deserve to

17

be told about their shortcomings, and they likewise

18

should be given the opportunity to mend their ways.

19

So I suggested that once the initial counseling was

20

over, if it was no correction to the problem, then it

21

would be followed up by a written communication with

22

the employee.

23
24
25

Q.

And at that time did you have the authority

to terminate a supervisor?
A.

No, I did not.
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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nation by Mr. Lee)

What was the procedure you had to follow if

wanted to terminate a supervisor?

a
3
4
5
6
7

A.

I would have to get clearance from my

immediate superior, the vice president, general
manager, and also the approval of the director of
human resources.
Q.

If the supervisor had committed a serious

8

offense, did you describe in this meeting what action

9

would be taken in the event of a serious offense?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

What was your -- your -- you said you

12

didn't talk to them about that, but what would you do

13

in the event of a serious offense?

14

A.

If a serious offense occurred, the

15

individual would be sent home, and I would have then

16

taken the opportunity to review the circumstances

17

with my superior and with the human resource people,

18

to decide on an appropriate course of action.

19
20

Q.

And are there some serious offenses, in

your view, that would result in termination?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

What offenses would those be?

23

A.

Theft, alcohol consumption on the jobsite,

24
25

to name but two.
Q.

All right.

Were there anything else in

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801) 521-5222
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EMPLOYEE'S NAME
.NT
SUPERVISOR'S NAME

Review Period-Business Year

U i V i - J t ^ ' l

K. M. Sorenson

TITLE

Anode General Foreman

Smelter

DEPT.

Hot Metals

P. L. Mikich

TITLE

Hot Metals Superintendent

ly

^

I. OVERALL ACCOMPLISHMENT RATING. Check the statement that best describes how well
the individual accomplished his goals.
[
] "Outstanding" performance - exceeds expected goals accomplishment in
practically every respect. Performance Category 5.
[ X ] "Above expected" performance - consistently exceeds expected goals
accomplishment. Performance Category 4.
[
] "Expected" performance - competent goals accomplishment. Performance
Category 3.
[
] "Below expected" performance - near average goals accomplishment; needs
improvement. Performance Category 2.
[
] Significant goals accomplishment improvement required for retention in
present position. Performance Category 1.
[
j-Insufficient time for goals accomplishment review in present position.
II. OVERALL ACCOMPLISHMENT RESULTS. Specify significant accomplishments and/or
inadequate performance results for regular and problem-solving, special project
or improvement goals:
Safety Performance
Anode department experienced two l o s t tirre i n j u r i e s in 1982 compared with two i n 1980
and one i n 1981. The l o s t t i r e i n j u r y rate was 2-72 in 1982 compared with 2.77 i n
1980 and 1.52 i n 1981.
Supervisors held 100% of scheduled monthly safety meetings; 19 JSA's were reviewed.
Cost and Production
Anode costs were 5.8% below the Phase I I I budget (4.4% below 1981 a c t u a l ) , a savings
o f $257,000. Cost per ton anodes produced was 99% of budget ($36,485 vs $36,884).
Anode manpower was reduced by 23 hourly (28 percent) and four supervisory (40 percent)
employees through job combinations during the year. At the same time overtime r a t e
was reduced 13% from 3.58% premium h o u r s / t o t a l hours worked to 3.13% and absenteeism
was reduced 2.2% from 5.75% to 5.65%.
Anode production wa's 9.3% below budget.

Anodes produced per day was 7.4% below budget.

Anode c a s t i n g r e j e c t rate was reduced 33% to 4.6% from 6.9% i n 1981.

Reviewer

Date

1982
Exempt
Grade 16 and Below
Merit Increase Guide Chart

j

Performance
Rating

5

4

3

2

1

|

Percent thru Ranqe and Timing
2/3
1/3
I
3/3
13.0 - 15.0

12.0 - 14.0

11.0 - 13.0

10 Months

11 Months

12 Months

11.0 - 13.0

10.0 - 12.0

11 Months

12 Months

13 Months

8.0 - 10.0

7.0 - 9.0

12 Months

13 Months

14 Months

6.0 - 8.0

5.0 - 7.0

i 9.0 - 11.0

16 Months

18 Months

-0-

-0-

9.0 - 11.0

1
I

Percent of
Population

10

I

30

50

-0-

8

-0-

2

Guide designed to produce a 10.17, increase in base salaries.
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BP AMERICA

t:

BP MINERALS AMERICA
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
AMR 2
[ LAST NAME

"

SORENSON

~~ INITIALS
K.

[ORGANIZATION

M.

EMPLOYEE ID.

| PRINT DATE

42111

LOCATION

UTAH COPPER

UNIT

1

DATE ON JOB

ENGINEER SENIOR METALLURGICAL
GRADE 17
1
. — . . —.
[SUPERVISOR (SIGNATURE)
I SUPERVISOR (PRfKT NAME)

.—1

DATE

B . GEORGE

REVIEWER (PRINT NAME)
S.

;

SMELTER

(CURRENT JOB TITLE/CO OE/Q RAD E

D.

15 F e b . 88

B.

REVIEWER (SIGNATURE)

DATE

SMITH

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING APPRAISAL
Check preprinted ID information for accuracy. Report any error to
Human Resources. Print your name and that of the reviewer in the
appropriate space.
Analyze prior tweive month performance by using the objectives for
the position. In the absence of objectives, performance is evaluated
against specific key responsibilities or components of the job.
Compare expected performance with obtained results.
Complete Parts 1 (only Sections A, B, C and D) and 2 using black pen.
Sign the appraisal in designated space at the top of this page and at the
bottom of Part 2 when complete.
Review the appraisal with the next level of management. Obtain
reviewer's comments in Part 1, Section E and in Part 2, Section C. Obtain
their signature in designated space at the top of this page and at the
bottom of Part 2.
Discuss Part 1 with employee. Complete Sections F and G With the
employee. Have the employee complete Section H and sign the
appraisal.
Return to Human Resources.
- 1 -

EXHIBIT

J

EMPLOYEE NAME
GUIDE TO PERFORMANCE RATINGS IN PART 1

RATING

PEFINfTIPN

E

Exceptional or outstanding performance which consistently exceeds all objectives
of the position.

S

Superior performance which Is consistently better than normally expected and
produces results which exceed the objectives of the position.

G+

Good performance which-consistently meets ail normal objectives of the position
and exceeds objectives In one or more major aspects of the work.

Q

Good performance which meets the normal objectives of the position.

Q-

Good performance which approaches what is normally expected In the position,
but which requires Improvement in one or more aspects of the work,
Unsatisfactory performance which does not consistently meet the normal objectives

U

of the position.

P

Poor performance which seldom meets normal objectives of the position,

N

New on Job but competent to d*t&>

PART 1: SUPERVISOR'S APPRAISAL OF JOB PERFORMANCE
A- ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
In the absence of objectives, pQrionr&ncQ is evaluated against specific keyresponstxTrtiesor components of the ph.
OBJECTIVES SET FOR REVIEW YEAR

(Including any key responsibilities
not covered in objectives)

COMMENTS ON ACHIEVEMENT OF
OBJECTIVES / KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

1. PROVIDE SUPPORT TO
THE OPERATIONS DURING
SMELTER START-UP

Successfully supervised the anode plant
operations as acting general foreman.

2. SUPERVISE SMELTER
RENOVATION PROJECTS

Supervised a number of renovation
projects which were completed on-time
and within budget.

3. PARTICIPATE ON THE

Successfully

FRESH START TEAM

Start Team.

participated

on the Fresh

RATING

G+

OBJECTIVES SET FOR REVIEW YEAR
(Including any key responsibilities
not covered in objectives)

LEAD THE START-UP
EFFORT FOR THE
FILTER PLANT

4. PROVIDE SPECIALIZED
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO
THE PLANT OPERATIONS

November, 1987

COMMENTS ON ACHIEVEMENT OF
OBJECTIVES / KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

Has dewonstrated

RATING

good understanding of

the filter plant system and is successfully coordinating start-up activities.
Communications and planning for_this_
job have improved recently but further
improvement is required. Attention to
detail and close follow-up of delegated
responsibilities needs some improvement.
Needs to improve technical breadth
and demonstrate more initiative in
identifying and acting on specific
opportunities for improvement.

G-

tf specific skills or abiGties are relevant to the position, rate them below.

J

SKlLLS/ABILmES

j

RATINGS
£

S

G

(LEADERSHIP - Atxitfytooeveicp in others
fthQ willingness ar>d desire to work towards
[common objectives

U

COMMENTS

P

X+

Good s k i l l s in line functions

X

Good s k i l l s . Fresh Start was
a good experience.

X

Needs to improve follow-up
when delegating.

,

1 *"pEvaOPJNG PEOPLE - Abiityt3seiect.
brain, coach and appraise staff, »et

3

ptar">dafd* of performance and provide tf*
Irrctfvatfon to ancourao* staff to arowh
ftheirjobs and accept greater respoosJbitty
DELEGATION - Efoovaness h deieoasng
fwork by assJgnfog respons/bflriy to
sutxxdnates and astablshing appropriate

Icontnob
JCOMMUNK^TON - Etectrveoess h boti
lorai and written comrnorkzticcatoinsurt
parity and corrpreriensJon

8
c:

INTERPERSONAL SENSITIVITY -Atto/lo
rncctfy behavior in a sensitive manner in order
[to interact effectivety with different people

INFLUENCE/IMPACT - Abilrtytoinfluence
pther*s thinking or actions and gain cornrnrtmerrt to Ideas, pfans or actions

X-

CONCEPTUAL

U06 KNOWLEDGE - Oerrcnstrafed toowkrige
& required teohnioues, methods and
technical skills and their effective application

Y

!

Communications l i m i t his
influence and impact.
Good knowledge of operations
needs to expand technical
hasp

JUDGMENT - AbOrtytoanalyze problems,
recognize the priorities involved, then
make sound conclusions and take effective
action

j

PLANNING ANO ORGANIZING - Abfty to
organize and producerealisticplans for
accompfishing objectives to meet work
priorities

PERSONAL

P a r t i c u l a r l y good with foremerl
and day pay.
j

X+

LU

NITLATlVE - Effectiveness in making
necessary decisions and taking appropriata
action to achieve resutts

x> j

Generally good but would
benefit from a more open,
team approach.

X

S k i l l s could be improved.

X-

Needs to improve and
communicate actions.

X

Has worked successfully in
a wide range of areas.

\DAPTA8ILfTY - Ability to adapt to new
x changing circumstances and ambiguous or
>ressured situations

PROFIT AND COST SENSfTTViTY - Abiity to
tssess business opportunities andrisks,to
jentify and meet customer needs, and to
generate and implement ideas that either
^ximize profits or minimiZQ costs

X
|

OTHER

COSTS

Needs to improve, recently
shown- good improvement.

X
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EMPLOYEE NAME

C. OVERALL PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL RATING

Refer to page 2
for rating scale.

D. SUPERVISOR'S COMMENTS
Th* supervisor hat fr* cptJco to comment on the emptoyoe's overafl paffermanca.

Mr. Sorenson is an experienced, senior staff member with a good
knowledge of the smelter operations. He needs to improve his
communication skills and exercise greater initiative in planning
and organizing work. Mr. Sorenson has demonstrated he is a
capable supervisor in line jobs and he should be considered as
a candidate for supervisory jobs in the company.

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS
Tha mviawer has fr* option to cornrnani on parts A and 8 befcra signing fr* appraisal on page 1.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR T H E NEXT YEAR
The supervisor compktat this with tha empfoyaa to hduda objectives, training or o>veJopment recommendations Intended to
address a cWvek^pmentsJ need barrtfad in tha tppraisai.

• 5 November 1057

EMPLOYEE NAME
GL RECOMMENDED FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
The supervisor completes this section wrtft ct>e employee
1

findodinq brruoq and soeafic cosrtKXifs)]

(1) Line Management - Corrrneroa/
(2) Uoe Management - Technical
(3) Staff Specialist - TechnkaJ
(4) Staff Sp^ciafist - Professional
(5) Other - identify
GENERAL COMMENTS:

K

(1)

j

VIEWS O f EMPLOYEE
The employee competes tis sectfoa tf more space Isrequired,attach on addftooaf page.
MOBILITY:

Indicate your willingness to relocate within BP America and BP world-wide.
MOBILITY
(Please check where appropriate)
EXPLANATION

NOT MOBILE
MOBILE WITHIN U.S.A.
I

(2)

(3)

1

NO LIMITATIONS INCLUDING
INTERNATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS

EMPLOYEE CAREER INTEREST:

Indicate your future career Interests, e.g. type of position or specific Job
assignment desired.

EMPLOYEE REVIEW: Make any comments concerning the performance evaluation.

I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means that I have
been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily Imply that I agree with this evaluation.

Employee's Signature

Date

PRIVATE

BP AMERICA
BP MINERALS AMERICA
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
AMR 2
INITIALS

LAST NAME

EMPLOYEE LD.

PRINT DATE

42111

10-19-88

Sorenson, Kelly M.

UNfT

LOCATION

ORGANIZATION

Utah Copper

North Concentrator
DATE ON JOB

CURRENT JOB TTTteCODE/GRADE

Crushing and Grinding General Foreman
SUPER VISOR (PRINT NAME)

Grade:

18

07-22-88

SUPERVISOR (SIGNATURE)

DATE

G. A. Jungenberg
REVIEWER (PRINT KAME)

REVIEWER

3"

DATE

R. J. Ramsey

fNfSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING APPRAfSAL
Check preprinted ID information for accuracy. Report any error to
Human Resources. Print your name and that of the reviewer in the
appropriate space.
Analyze prior twelve month performance by using the objectives for
the position, in the absence of objectives, performance is evaluated
against specific key responsibilities or components of the job.
Compare expected performance with obtained results.
Complete Parts 1 (only Sections A, B, C and D) and 2 using black pen.
Sign the appraisal in designated space at the top of this page and at the
bottom of Part 2 when complete.
Review the appraisal with the next level of management. Obtain
reviewer's comments in Part 1, Section E and in Part 2, Section C. Obtain
their signature in designated space at the top of this page and at the
bottom of Part 2.
Discuss Part 1 with employee. Complete Sections F and G with the
employee. Have the employee complete Section H and sign the
appraisal.

f

Return to Human Resources.
1 -

EXHIBIT

1

GUIDE TO PERFORMANCE RATINGS IN PART1

RATING
E

DEFINITION
Exceptional or outstanding performance which consistently exceeds all objectives
of the position.

S

Superior performance which Is consistently better than normally expected and
produces results which exceed the objectives of the position,

G+

Good performance which consistently meets all normal objectives of the position
and exceeds objectives Jn one or more major aspects of the work.

Q

Good performance which meets the normal objectives of the position.

Q-

Good performance which approaches what It normally expected In the position,
but which requires Improvement In ooe or more aspect* of the work.
Unsatisfactory performance which does not consistently meet the normal objectives

U

of the potftJoru
P

Poor performance which seldom meets normal objectives of the position.

N

New on Job but competent to date.

PART1: SUPERVISOR'S APPRAISAL OF JOB PERFORMANCE
A. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
in the absence of objectives, performance is evaluated against speafic key responabShies or components of the pb.
I OBJECTIVES SET FOR REVIEW YEAR

COMMENTS ON ACHIEVEMENT OF
OBJECTIVES / KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

J (Including any key responsibilities
I
not covered In objectives)

SAILTY £ flOUSKKKPING

ACTUAL

PLAN

G

Lost Time Accidents
Bonneville Operation

2

iEHA C i t a t i o n s
Bonneville Operation

1 (non serious & substantial)

I Housekeeping
PRODUCTION
Throughput (TED)
Grind + 100 mesh (%)

RATING

2
0-

Has improved dramatically in the l a s t
quarter.
ACTUAL

PLAN

% PERFORMANCE

29,175
21.7

30,000
24.0

97.3
no.O

1.12

1.32

117.9

G+

G+

COST
July/Sep $/ton ore milled

S

- 2 -

EMPLOYEE NAME _ i

ison, Kellv M.

A. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES (cont'd)
OBJECTIVES SET FOR REVIEW YEAR

COMMENTS ON ACHJEVEWENTOF
OBJECTIVES / KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

(Including any key responsibilities
not covered In objectives)
EFFECTIVE RUNNING T H E
Primary Crusher
Standard Crusher
Tertiary Crusher
Rod Mills
Ball Mills

ACTUAL

PLAN

33.1

50^0

70.4
81.6
90.8
89.2

76.0
81.0
92.0
92.0

% PERFORMANCE

66.2
92.6
100.7
98.7
97.0

OTHER
General

Kelly has made the transition to the
concentrator and became a key figure_in
iDeeting the safety and production needs
at Bonneville. He has shora a desire to
inprove housekeeping throughout the plant.

- 3-

RATING

EMPLOYEENA,.

Sorensnn. Kellv M.

B. MANAGERIAL SKILLS AND ABILITIES
If specific skifls or aix&fces are relevant to the position, rate them beJow.
I

SKILLS/ABILITIES

J

RATINGS

E

SUPERVISORY

[LEADERSHIP - Ab&ry to develop in otters.
[the willingness and desire to work towards
joommon effectives

S

G

U

|Has the respect of others t o
achieve a caimon goal.

X

jDevELOPiNG PEOPLE - AbfctytoseJect,
[train, coach and appraise staff, »et
{standards of performance and provide tfw
imotfrafioci to encourage staff to prow in
f ^ r j o b s and accept greater responsbtfty
DELEGATION - Efiec&veness h defcajaang
[work by assigning respoaslbflrr/ to
stixxrinaies and establishing appropriate
[controls

COMMENTS

P

X

Assigns tasks and jobs t o
subordinates as t h e i r a b i l i t y
permits.

G+
J

KX)MMUN1CATDN - Btectrveness h both
[oral and written corrtrrsjricafions to insure
Idartty and compreriensJon

i -J
<
1
1

,—,

,

1

^^1EfipeFso^^

1 0:

CONCEPTUAL

___

I Has good s k i l l s i n passing on 1
and i n i t i a t i n g directions t o
subordinates and superiors.

X

2 : Lnnocffy benavbr in a sensitive manner in order
cc fto interact effectivefy with different people
LU
CL

1

j
|

X

INFLUENCE/IMPACT - Atxlrty to influence
bther's thinking or actions and gain comrnrlInnectltoideas, fians or actions

X

kJ08 KNOWLEDGE - Derronsfcated tawtedge
cf raquared techniques, methods and
technical skills and their effective application

G-

Has only had a short exposure 1
t o current job. Expect t o
improve w i t h time.

G-

Should work on increasing j o b
knowledge t o gain confidence
i n decision making.

X

Very good at planning and
scheduling a j o b to complete
i n a inininium time.

JUDGMENT - Abtlrty to analyze problems,
recognize the prioritys involved, then
make sound condusions and take effective
action

!

PLANNING AND ORGANIZING - Abaty to
organize and produce realistic plans for
accomplishing objectives to meet work
priorities

1

INITIATIVE - Effectiveness in rnafcung

i

1necessary decisions and taking appropriate

1 -J haction to achieve results
< 1

I

I
I

X

\DAPTABILfTY - Ability to adapt to new
* changing circumstances and ambiguous or
xessured situations

5k

COSTS

a

r

^ROFrT AND COST SENSfTIVITY - AbJrty to
assess business opportunities and risks, to 1
dentrry and meet customer needs, and to
generate and implement ideas thai either
1
naximize profits or minimize costs
|

LiL

Has had t o nx>ve i n t o a new
p o s i t i o n under adverse
conditions.

X

X

11

- 4 -

1

1

EMPLOYEE NAME

C OVERALL PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL RATING

a

anson, K e l l y M.

Refer to page 2
for rating scale.

SUPERVISOR'S COMMENTS
The supervisor has the opton to common! on the employee's overall performance.

Kelly was transferred from the Shelter t o the Bonneville concentrator in July
of t h i s year. He has had to learn the p l a n t , i t s people and operation as well
as adapt t o a new operating environment. He has done wall in a l l aspects.
During t h i s time extensive mechanical problems and operational d i f f i c u l t i e s
e x i s t e d , especially in July and early August. He has succeeded in managing h i s
area and placing i t on a course of improvement. The area of housekeeping has
shown exceptional gains.

E. REVIEWER'S COMMENTS
The reviewer has the opfoo to comment on parts A and B before sagring the appraisal on page 1.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR
The supervtsor completes this with the employee to indude objectives, training or development recommendations intended to
address a developmental need iderrfrfed in the appraisal.

The continuation of learning more about t h e operation of Bonneville i s of
p r m e concern. With increased job knowledge the a b i l i t y t o make b e t t e r
judgement decisions and therefore improved planning will follow.
The importance of cost reduction w i l l be paramont in the future operation
of t h e Bonneville concentrator.

EMPLOYEE NAME

a

Sorengpn, K e l l y M.

RECOMMENDED FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
[

"

ccMve^rs
pnduding timing and specific pos'ft>on(s)l

1
|

(1) Line Management - Commerdal
(2) Lbe Management - Technical
(3) Staff SpedaDst - Technksrf
(4) Staff Spedafist - Professtanaf
(5) Otfw - Identify
[GENERAL COMMENTS:

I

H. VIEWS OF EMPLOYEE
The enpbyee corrpJetes tis secfica tf more space Isrequired,attach an a&tftfonaf peoe.
(1) MOBILTTY:

Indicate your willingness to relocate within BP America and BP world-wide.
WOBILfTY
(Pleas* check where appropriate)
EXPLANATION
NOT MOBILE
MOBILE WTTHJN U.S.A.

^
t S l .

NO UMTT ATiONS INCLUDING
INTERNATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS

(2) EMPLOYEE CAREER INTEREST: indicate your future career interests, e.g. type of position or specific job
assignment desired.

(3) EMPLOYEE REVIEW: Make any comments concerning the performance evaluation.

I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means that I have
been advised of my performance status and doe^^not necessarily Imply that I agree with this evaluation.

Employee's Signature

Date

\Q~2Js^

1989 Goals - K. M» Sorenson
Meet or exceed all 1989 safety and health and operating goals.
Continue improvement in grinding to achieve a 21.0% + 100 mesh
level at year end. {<\fr\
Finish plant cleanup by March 1989 and maintain a 90% standard
throughout year.
Install and optimize cyclone overflow box screens by May 1989.
Continue plant painting program with expected completion of
major operating areas by May 1989.
Become familiar with Magna flotation operation to the extent
thatf short term supervision would be possible. Complete a
major part of this goal by June 1989.
Analyze and implement what is required to place the tertiary
crushers in automatic control by July 1989.
Be prepared to fill in as acting plant superintendent during
temporary vacancies.

BP MINERALS AMERIC

PRIVATE
PART 2: COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AND DISCUSSED WITH REVIEWER
DO NOT REVIEW WfTH EMPLOYEE
EMPLOYEE NAME

A. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL
GRADE OR GRADE RANGE
THAT MAY BE ACHIEVABLE
WITHIN TIME FRAMES

TIMING
1

Sorenson, Kelly M.

SPECIFIC POSmONS TO
WHICH EMPLOYEE tS PROMOTABLE

Now

5Y«rs
1

North Concentrator Superintendent

22

2Y«re
|

IMmsda

1
With experience and background could be considered for both smelter
GENERALCOMMEKTS: ^ i n f u t u r e j concentrator p o s i t i o n s .

1

B. SUCCESSION PLANNING
Irvolcala In order of preference tose omployDes you think are qua&fed to movo Into this posttoa

CURRENTTTTLE
flf available)

NAME(S)

READINESS

SHORT-RANGE

0. F. Jensen

Flotation General Foreman

K. Y. Onstott
D. D. Dea

Principle Metallurgical Eng.
i Maintenance General Foreman

(within 1 year)

LONG-RANGE
(within 2-5 years)

!

C. REVIEWER'S COMMENTS
The reviewer has the opton to comment on part 2 and to make recorrmerdations tor future development

j
j

EXHIBIT 4

Third Judicial District

APR
BARBARA K. POLICH (2620)
T . PATRICK CASEY (0591)
Of

and

2 1992

y SALTLAtCEcOuNrv
^ r\ ^ / / V ' V

for

On^u-cy Ceric

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN-THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KELLY SORENSON,

)
)
)

Plamtltt,
vs.

ORDER AND.JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL

)

KENNECOTT UTAH COPPER
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

)
)
)

Defendant.

Civil No:) 890905608
Judge Scott Daniels

)

* * * * * * * *

This matter came before the court on March 10, 1992,the Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, on defendant's Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal dated and filed herein February 28, 1992.
Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, Stephen W. Cook and
Reid C. Davis of and for Cook & Davis, and defendant was represented by its counsel, Barbara K. Polich and T. Patrick Casey of
and for Parsons Behle & Latimer.

Plaintiff completed the presen-

tation of his evidence at the trial herein on January 27 through
30,

1992, and defendant properly moved the Court for involuntary

dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

Having

fully

heard

and considered

the

evidence presented to the Court and the arguments of counsel
herein and being fully advised in this matter, the Court hereby
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Based upon the evidence presented thus far, the

Court would find as follows:
(a)

that at the time the plaintiff was hired by

Kenne.cott, there was no particular dtscussion as to whether he
would be an at-will employee or whether he could be terminated
for cause only, whether he was employed for any particular term,
or whether he was entitled to any kind of progressive discipline.
(b)
been

that a policy of progressive discipline had

in place at the Kennecott plant for some time; it was

required by contract for the union represented employees and it
was applied in a much less formal manner~to management employees,
but for the most part, progressive discipline was practiced just
as a matter of good management.
(c)

that, although there is some evidence to the

contrary, during the course of plaintiff's employment, his performance was good.
(d)

that

when

plaintiff

was

assigned

to

the

Bonneville Concentrator, there were significant maintenance problems there due to the fact that there had been a considerable
amount of deferred maintenance as a result of shut-down, and it

-2-

was necessary to try to keep production levels up, and at the
same time catch up on the deferred maintenance; that was a difficult thing to do and there were significant problems.
(e)

that there were also problems with scheduled

time off and a number of things which made plaintiff's success at
the Bonneville Concentrator quite difficult.
(f)

that, although plaintiff made sufficient or

significant improvements in the condition of the Bonneville Concentrator while he was there and some of the maintenance was
caught up and production levels were for the most part "maintained, his performance was clearly not satisfactory to management for one reason or another, and he was terminated for- that
reason.
2.

Based upon the evidence presented, the Court finds

that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof that there
existed a contract between Kennecott and the plaintiff for either
continued, employment or for progressive discipline.
3.

Based upon the evidence presented, the-Court also

finds that, although progressive discipline was being practiced,
it was never part of a contract.
4.

The Court does not find either Exhibit 1 (the Gen-

eral Rules of Conduct dated July 1, 1973), the seminars, or any
of the subsequent documents to be sufficient evidence to convince
the Court that there was ever an implied-in-fact contract between
plaintiff and Kennecott.

-3-

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

The presumption is that plaintiff was an employee

at-will and that presumption has not been rebutted.
2.

Based upon that presumption and plaintiff's fail-

ure to prove the existence of an implied-in-fact contract of
employment, Kennecott

management

had

the right

to

terminate

plaintiff at its discretion.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, and good cause appearing,
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED

AND

ADJUDGED

that

the

above-entitled action be. and hereby is dismissed with prejudice
and

on the merits.

Defendant

is awarded

incurred herein.
DATED this

day of April, 1992.
BY THE COURT

CM

SCOTT DANtEtS
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

COOK—-^
STEPHEN
REID C. DAVIJ
COOK & DAVIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
TPC/031192C

its taxable

costs

EXHIBIT 5

AUG <>o 1990

BARBARA K. POLICH (2620)
T. PATRICK CASEY (0591)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KgLLY SORENSON,
KEKOR&KDUK IK SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
K2NNECOTT UTAH COPPER
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

Civil No. 890905608
Judge Daniels

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

Defendant

Kennecott

Utah Copper

Corporation,

by

and

through counsel, submits the following Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed
herein,

affidavits of Qor^Id L. Bafcicvchak, P. Orev Kv^ter, Louis

J, Cononelos, Billie Newton Burke, and C. Dale Sharp are filed
herewith and establish the uncontroverted facts set forth below.
Portions of the Deposition of Kelly Sorenson cited herein are
attached hereto as Appendix A.

Rather, this motion is made on the grounds that, based upon the
undisputed
Sorenson

facts

set

has no basis

forth

below,

as

for

alleging

a matter

either

of

law,

the breach

of

Mr.
an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the existence
of the implied promise alleged in his complaint requiring cause
for

termination, advance notice of unsatisfactory

job perfor-

mance, and progressive discipline.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based

upon

the pleadings,

the depositions,

and

the

affidavits filed herein, the following facts are not in dispute:
1.

This action is based solely upon allegations that

the termination of Mr. Sorenson 1 s employment was in breach (1) of
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and (2) of an
implied promise that he could be terminated only for cause, and
only

with

advance

notice

progressive discipline.
2.
Sorenson 1 s

of

inadequate

work performance

(Complaint, 1 7 , 9 ) .

The sole basis alleged in the Complaint
claim

of

and

an

implied

promise

that

he

for Mr.
could

be

Footnote continued from previous page.
facility was unacceptable and that Kennecott was dissatisfied
with Mr. Sorenson's performance in dealing with the problem. Mr.
Sorenson claims he adequately performed his duties and received
no criticisms, warning or notice of the fact that Kennecott management was dissatisfied with his performance prior to his termination.
-3-

EXHIBIT 6

REID C. DAVIS, USB #4475
Attorney for Plaintiff
COOK & DAVIS
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City,, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 595-8600
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KELLY SORENSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

ORDER

KENNECOTT UTAH COPPER
CORPORATION, A Delaware
Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

Civil No. 890905608
Judge Scott Daniels

Hearing was held on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend its Complaint,
Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit's of
David Dea, Larry Dea, and Jerry Hansen, Defendant's Motion
to Strike the Affidavit of Kelly Sorenson and the
Supplemental Affidavit of David Dea, and Defendant's Motion
to Seal Record, the 16th day of November, 1990 in the
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Scott Daniels
presiding.

Plaintiff was present represented by his

counsel Reid C. Davis, Esq. Defendant was present
represented by its counsel Barbara Polich, Esq.
-1-

The Court

having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by the parties,
the argument of respective counsel in open court, and
based upon other pleadings and papers on file herein and
for good cause shown, now therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That material issues of fact exist in this matter

and therefore Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied.
2.

Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit

testimony in the Affidavit's of David Dea, Larry Dea,
Tracy Johnson and Jerry Hansen is denied.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend its Complaint is

granted.
4.

Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

Kelly Sorenson as untimely is granted.
5.

Defendant's Motion to Strike the Supplemental

Affidavit of David Dea as untimely is denied.
6.

Defendant's Motion to Seal the Record in

connection with the Affidavit of Kelly Sorenson and the
Supplemental Affidavit of David Dea is granted.
DATED this

day of

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
-2-

DATED this

day of

APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

BARBARA POLICH
Attorney for Defendant

-3-

, 1990,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH

)

:s,
County of Salt Lake )
AMY J- HOFHEINS, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the office of Cook & Davis,
Attorneys at Law, Reid C. Davis, attorney for the
Plaintiff, herein; and that she served the attached
ORDER, upon:
Barbara Polich
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street
Suite 7 00
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United states Mail at Salt Lake City,
Utah, on the -ZQTH day of November, 199 0.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
November, 1990.

,

^s-^r-

Notary Public
a
KAREN L KNUTSC.*; *
1815 E Osap© Orange Avo.)
Salt tafce City. Utah 841241
My Commission Expires I
December 30,1992 I
State of Utah
J

2JQ^H

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at Salt Lake County

